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MICRO AND MACRO SOCIOLOGICAL CAUSES OF VIOLENT
ATROCITIES
Randall Collins
University of Pennsylvania, Sociology Department, Philadelphia, United States of America
To examine the structures that cause violent atrocities, it is useful to begin with a his-
torical instance. I have chosen an example which contains a range of kinds of violence,
some more extreme, more cruel, than others, but all within a short period of time.
Cruelty is variable; it does not happen every minute, even in social settings where it
may be culturally approved; and at some moments it happens where it is not
approved. Everything has multiple causes, and these conditions must intersect at a
particular time and place if anything is to happen. Cruelty has both small local mi-
cro-dynamics and large macro-sociological conditions, and these together determine
the fateful moments when cruelty will happen or does not happen. Long-lasting
structural conditions are not enough; because of the micro-component, cruelty when
examined closely has a contingent quality, although as a sociological theorist I would
prefer to consider this as its time-dynamics.
My example is the most destructive race riot in US history. It took place in
New York City during four days in July 1863 (Asbury, 1928: 87-173). It is sometimes
called the New York draft riot, since the instigating cause was the compulsory draft
of troops for the Federal army, just then in the midst of the Civil War against the
slave states of the South. President Lincoln, who had recently emancipated the
slaves, and the Abolitionists, were unpopular with the Irish immigrant population
who lived, mostly in poverty, in the lower part of Manhattan. The draft was partic-
ularly unpopular since it allowed wealthier citizens to buy their way out of con-
scription. In New York, the conflict pitted Anglo-Protestant middle and upper
classes against lower-class Irish Catholics. The Irish were prepared to fight; they
were already organized in neighborhoods political clubs or gangs, which often
brawled with each other, and which regularly fought with the police, especially at
election times. Irish patrimonial organizations, which the Anglos regarded as cor-
rupt, struggled over control of city politics. Only recently a reform had centralized
the police under control of Anglo elites; this had resulted in violent struggles be-
tween rival groups of police and their supporters in 1857, only six years earlier. The
Irish were well mobilized to resent what they saw as another imposition of An-
glo-Protestant power, and to strike back against the draft.
The first day of riots began by massive crowds, numbering around 10,000,
marching uptown to attack the headquarters of the draft board where the selection
was taking place. At first the crowds had success, forcing small numbers of police
to retreat, occupying and burning two official buildings of the draft and a state ar-
mory. The crowd then moved on to find new targets, for a riot needs action to
sustain itself and a crowd which is doing nothing soon falls apart. But the next tar-
gets chosen were better defended; repeated assaults on the main Abolitionist
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newspaper, The New York Tribune, were driven back; and a march on police head-
quarters was met by a police counterattack. Although the police numbered no
more than a few hundred against crowds of many thousands, the police attacked in
a determined phalanx wielding clubs, and after a short 15 minute battle, forced the
crowd to flee. How was this possible, that such small numbers could prevail, and
without the use of guns? Clubs could be quite deadly, and contemporary descrip-
tions claim the cops ferociously broke heads and killed rioters with their blows. Yet
the rioters were similarly armed, also carrying a small number of guns — which
however were not very effective in the crowded streets.
Here we must invoke a general principle, which I have documented in my
book, Violence. A Micro-Sociological Theory (Collins, 2008). Winning or losing in a vi-
olent conflict is first of all a matter of who establishes emotional dominance; that
side wins which holds together better, keeping up greater solidarity, and taking the
initiative away from its opponent; emotional dominance comes first and makes
possible physical dominance. Thus 100 police smashing the front of the crowd of
thousands in a narrow street were able to turn its march into a disorderly retreat,
leaving many luckless rioters open to being clubbed while they were stumbling
and running away.
This pattern was repeated in numerous battles between crowds and police
during the next days. Some of the rioters responded with better organized tactics;
they took up defensive positions on rooftops, from where they could throw bar-
rages of stones, causing many casualties among police. Army troops began to ar-
rive on the second day and to use artillery against the crowds; when rioters
retreated to defensive positions in upper windows and rooftops, the authorities
developed an effective combined arms tactic of police clearing the building with
their clubs, driving the rioters into the streets where they could be shot. On the sec-
ond day, rioters set up European-style barricades, similar to those in 1830 and 1848
in Paris; but again the police and army attacked with superior weapons and supe-
rior energy and destroyed the amateur fortifications. Losses were heavy: during
four days, police and army suffered 50 killed and over 1000 wounded; rioters lost
2000 killed and 8000 wounded, including many women and children — the bulk of
the crowds being below the age of 20.
Despite this string of defeats, the riot continued, since there were numerous
crowds throughout lower Manhattan, perhaps totaling 50,000 participants, who
flowed away from the points of police strength to attack undefended targets. This
is another general principle of violence: most violence is successful by finding
weak victims. Thus rioters successfully attacked and burned several isolated police
precinct stations, left largely unmanned because the police had been called away to
muster in a few major actions. The homes of well-known citizens, such as the
Mayor, the Postmaster, the newspaper editor, were attacked and burned if there
were little guard. One must conceive of a riot as a temporary community of shared
consciousness which can keep itself together only if it has attainable goals — tar-
gets where it can gain victories, where it can establish its own emotional domi-
nance and keep up its emotional energy. The side in the conflict which is generally
losing — and this was the condition of the rioters whenever they met the police and
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the troops after the middle of the first day — tends to split off to seek easy targets.
At first these were clear symbols of their enemies, upper class homes nearby on
their line of march which were burned or looted, even as rioters retreated from the
police. It was in this context that the riot began attacking negroes.
Here again the riot began with official targets and proceeded to opportunistic
attacks on exposed individuals. On the first afternoon, as attacks on the Abolition-
ist newspaper and other official targets were thwarted, a crowd attacked the
Colored Orphan Asylum; most of the children escaped, but the building was
looted and then burned, and one small negro girl who had been left behind was
killed. Small groups of rioters began to invade hotels, restaurants, even bars and
brothels in the lower-class part of the city, seeking negro servants to attack. Negro
homes were burned, and negroes on the streets were beaten and hung. These were
easy targets, not only because the negroes offered little resistance, but because ne-
gro areas were dispersed among the Irish slums — in fact, the poorest of both races
tended to live in the same place, so the rioters had the emotional comfort of fighting
on their home turf. On the second and especially third days of the riot, attacks on
negroes became the main success of the rioters.
These were displays of ritualistic cruelty. Isolated negroes were surrounded
by crowds which beat them repeatedly and dropped heavy stones on their heads;
women, who made up a minority of the crowds, came forward on these occasions
to stab the bodies, to pour oil into the wounds and set them on fire. Here we are un-
questionably in the presence of deliberate cruelty. Sociologically we should ana-
lyze the emergence of cruelty in the time-dynamics of the crowd’s action, the
temporal process by which the crowd prolonged its focus of attention on those
places where it felt itself most dominant, its little bubbles and pockets of victorious
emotion. Violence against isolated negroes was gratuitous, prolonged, overkill;
bodies that were dead or unconscious nevertheless were repeatedly mutilated;
burned bodies were hanged. The symbolic significance of these bodies as rally-
ing-points for the crowd is shown by incidents which culminated the last day of ri-
oting; the last big mob, totaling 5000 — the last time rioters were able to assemble in
large numbers — hung a number of negroes along 8th Avenue. Army troops fired
artillery into the crowd and drove them away, and cut down the negro bodies
hanging from street lamps. When the army moved on, the mob returned to re-hang
the bodies; eventually the police returned, took possession of the area, cut down
the bodies and removed them. The trophies of battle gone, the riot finally dispersed
and petered out.
There are plenty of instances of cruelty throughout the riot. By modern stan-
dards, we would regard firing artillery into a crowd to be cruel, and having one’s
head beaten in by a policeman’s massive club would also be singled out by the mod-
ern media; casualties of women and children in these mêlées are shocking to us.
Burning defenseless negroes no doubt seemed especially cruel even at the time, be-
cause it was prolonged and deliberate. But rioters too had been burned, chiefly on
the first afternoon, when in the last of the crowd’s big victories, the state armory had
been captured. While rioters were upstairs ransacking the weapons, a police coun-
ter-attack outside the building caused a panic; fearing the police might recapture the
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building, rioters set the downstairs floor on fire, burning hundreds of rioters who
had barricaded themselves in upstairs. The fact that the crowd itself had started the
fire was probably not appreciated at the time; the rioters no doubt considered the
horrible deaths of their companions who had jumped from the burning roof, as the
responsibility of the police. These are the emotional dynamics of a violent situation;
if it is prolonged over a period of time — in this case, hours of tension stretching into
several days — emotional and cognitive polarization sets in, both sides seeing the
other as increasingly evil and inhuman; the perceived cruelty of the enemy becomes
the incentive to practice cruel revenge, leading to a cycle culminating in the battle
over the charred bodies of hanged and mutilated negroes on the third day of the riot.
Cruelty must always be located in time-dynamics — in the build-up of emo-
tional polarization, and in the process of finding weak victims to keep a crowd mo-
bilized when it no longer can prevail against the official targets with which it
began. In fact the first victims of the crowd’s ritualistic violence were isolated po-
licemen and soldiers, caught away from their mass formations on the first after-
noon; it was later, when police in phalanxes were no longer vulnerable targets, that
torturing negroes became the crowd’s chief preoccupation. Cruelty is not constant
over time; it has its peak moments. These same Irish had lived in New York City
with the negroes peaceably until those moments arrived — a pattern reminiscent of
the ethnic atrocities in Bosnia in the 1990s.
Yet, although cruelty has its micro-dynamics, there is a structural aspect as
well. Not all riots turn to ritual mutilation, torture, and prolonged battles over
hanging corpses. When it is that violence upon one’s perceived enemies is more
prolonged, ritualistic, and pointedly symbolic? By historical comparison, the in-
tensity of cruelty is greater where groups are separated from each other by strongly
ritualized boundaries. The archetype are tribal societies, which keep up strong in-
ternal solidarity; living in close proximity, in dense networks closed to outsiders,
engaged in collective activities that leave little room for individualism or cosmo-
politan connections, these are societies of a high degree of Durkheimian solidarity,
a strong collective consciousness and sense of its own identity (Durkheim, 1964
[1893]; Black, 1998). Morality is tight but local, demanding commitment of the indi-
vidual in support of the group, but lacking moral sympathy with outsiders re-
garded as scarcely human. In such segmentary societies, ritualized boundaries are
constantly being enacted against neighbouring tribes; the nearest tribe is also one’s
worst rival and enemy. It is true that enmity among segmented societies is not con-
stant, and relationships with neighbouring groups can be mixed with ambiguous
exchanges. Thus even where the structure promotes hostility, the contingencies of
everyday interaction often contradict the facade of ferociousness.
In part this is because violence in tribal societies is not usually very effective,
since military organization is low, and mutual suspicion keeps both sides from ex-
posing themselves when they are isolated and weak. But although victims in tribal
warfare may be comparatively few in any one fight, they are celebrated with great fe-
rocity. Indeed, the ferocity serves to dramatize the importance of the victory because
success against an enemy is so episodic and uncertain. In tribal societies, captives
may be tortured at length in collective ceremonies which assemble the group and
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thus serve as Durkheimian rituals of group supremacy (Collins, 2004; 2008). The
death of an enemy in a tribal vendetta is celebrated with joyful dancing, and even a
woman or a small child can be a suitable victim when — as if often the case — tribal
warfare is too incompetent to score a real military victory. Occasionally through
stealth an undefended enemy village may be taken, in which case a total massacre
can happen — headhunters in the Philippines, for instance, prefer to attack when the
enemy is asleep (Rosaldo, 1980). Group identity is so strong that categories of non-
combatants are not singled out in the modern manner, and massacres of women and
children evoke no moral qualms, although under some circumstances it may be con-
sidered a practical policy to take some of them as slaves, or even eventually to adopt
them into one’s own side to fill gaps left by the dead. Here, what by modern stan-
dards would be considered extreme cruelty is not locally recognized as such, and
even is celebrated as the group’s glory. This is the ancient morality that Nietzsche
(1956 [1887]) perceived, where there is no standard of sympathy outside one’s own
ranks, and good is equated with collective dominance.
The exemplars of ritually segmented societies are simple tribes of the pre-state
period, but similar structures exist inside historically more complex societies where
residence and economy are segregated into local ethnic enclaves. It has often been
noted that modern urban gangs are like artificially constructed tribes, practicing hon-
orific vendettas and defending their turf against their nearest neighbours; gangs con-
struct boundaries through initiation rites and symbolic emblems of identity such as
graffiti, or handsigns which are used to provoke battles. Gangs build self-contained is-
lands of purely localistic morality, dramatizing their ferociousness against their ene-
mies with threats of exemplary cruelty, although indeed much of this is bluster and
bragging which they rarely are competent to carry out. The Irish who joined in the
1863 New York draft riot were not ordinarily a unified group; most of the time they
identified with their smaller neighbourhood gangs, fighting periodically with other
Irish gangs, for the most part using clubs and stones. Localistic fighting of this sort
tends to become routine, especially when it happens inside the larger context of a
modern society; and the intra-Irish gang fights, although they caused many injuries
and a few deaths, were not on the whole known for extreme ritualistic cruelty such as
mutilating and hanging burned bodies. To explain this higher level of cruelty we need
an additional cause.
Again historical comparisons reveal the structural pattern: ritualized public
displays of cruelty upon helpless victims are most strongly institutionalized in soci-
eties which combine hierarchic stratification with strongly ritualized group mem-
bership. Such are the societies of caste or estate, where honorific aristocrats demand
extreme deference from peasants or slaves, and where intermediate classes of gentry,
priests, merchants, or craftsmen guard their own ritual boundaries and demand
what deference they can from those below. Historically these are the type of society
in which power and wealth are most unequal; unlike tribal societies (or gangs) which
are relatively flat internally and do their fighting horizontally, we have here a society
in which everyday life is vertical, imposing deference upon underlings. But both
egalitarian tribes and hierarchies of status groups (to use Weber’s term) have this in
common, that both of them have a high degree of Durkheimian social density:
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everything is highly visible, no one is anonymous, the force of public attention is on
everyone all the time. In a ritualized hierarchic structure emotional dominance is al-
ways at issue; upper classes are full of pride and arrogance, those below them have
varying diets of humiliation, with opportunities to pass it along to someone else
even lower. These are the societies in which public executions are like carnivals,
gaudy displays of torture, mutilation, and prolonged death, even punishment after
death. In the long struggles between Scotland and England from the 13th through
the 18th centuries, for instance, rebellious chieftans would not only be hanged but
their heads displayed on the city walls on pikes (Mackie, 1978). It has been argued
that these forms of public cruelty were calculated displays; since government power
was intermittent and most resistance could not be stopped, authorities made the
most of the few malefactors they could catch for token displays of terrifying power.
(This is similar to the analysis of Helbling, 2006, of pre-state violence generally.)
There is an element of truth in this, but we should not forget the moral context: by the
20th century complex societies preferred to hide away the ultimate powers of coer-
cion and everyone would be shocked by displaying the bloody head of even the
worst child-murderer. In historical perspective of previous societies, a remarkable
thing about the Nazi death camps was that they were kept secret; 13th century
Mongols (and many other peoples) conquering a city had their death camps in pub-
lic, and piled up mounds of skulls to brag about the deed. This is not just a change in
the calculating power of states; it is a change in the social boundaries of morality,
from those in which cruelty on proper occasions was a public ritual celebrating the
stratified public order, but in modern times changing into a new form of morality in
which coercion, although still present, is hidden as much as possible, and cruelty is
now considered to be immoral.
Where do the Irish crowds stand in this perspective, when in New York of
1863 they engaged in ritualistic killings with prolonged torture, mutilation, and
public display? The Irish had endured years of treatment as a despised lower caste,
even regarded by the Anglo-American elite as a separate race, the “black Irish” —
cut off by their poverty, their Catholicism, their un-puritanical customs and even
their local success in controlling politics in lower Manhattan. The draft riots from
the outset breathed an atmosphere of resentment against hated elite. The New York
Irish, too, were out of harmony with the moral stance of the social elite engaged in
an altruistic Christian crusade to free the slaves. From our modern perspective, this
puts the Irish even more in the wrong; but in terms of their local social structure,
their allegiance was to their own group; their attacks on the Abolitionist newspa-
per make it clear that the militant altruists who had started the war were regarded
not only as alien but as persecutors of the Irish, trying to close down their saloons
and brothels. Irish tribal mentality was only then taking steps towards unification
among themselves, the separate gangs cooperating in the huge crowds which
fought against the draft boards and the city elite.
One further puzzle is why the most ritualistic cruelty in the 1863 riot was car-
ried out by the Irish, rather than by the police and the army (although we could see
cruelty in the tactics of the latter as well). In a hierarchic caste society, most of the rit-
ualistic cruelty is downwards; it is the aristocrats and their agents who do most of
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the torturing, mutilating, beheading, and displaying mangled bodies (Black, 1998).
The upper classes control the means of military and political mobilization, and
most of the means of ritual assembly as well. It is the transition to modern struc-
tures that enables political violence by the lower classes; democratization and ur-
banization opened up possibilities to mobilize on a larger political scale; upward
resentment could be vocalized culturally, and resistance mobilized. Hence the fury
of the Irish attack on upper-class institutions in New York, when a large-scale issue
— the military draft that threatened all of them — gave them incentive to overcome
their inter-tribal antagonisms and act in unison against a culturally alien enemy. If
we think of democracy, not as an ideal form, but as an actual historical process of
mobilizing the previously un-mobilized, we must recognize that it has generated
plenty of opportunities for cruelty, especially in its early phases. Michael Mann, in
The Dark Side of Democracy (2005), gives comparative evidence that the massacres of
modern ethnic cleansing happen in populist democracies, which I would interpret
as the combination of democratic mobilization with Durkheimian ritualistic en-
claves prone to moralistic boundary violence. Thus it was the Irish in New York,
precisely at the moment that they were breaking out of their immigrant ghettos
into larger political participation that engaged in the widest outbreak of ritualistic
cruelty.
But if structurally based resentment was against the Anglo upper classes,
why did the negroes bear the brunt of the ritualistic cruelty? One could argue that
lower groups displace their anger against those even lower; but this does not cap-
ture the episodic nature of the situation of those rapidly moving hours. In fact the
crowd did most of their fighting with the police and the soldiers; only 20 negroes
were hanged, but these murders were so spectacularly cruel — so spectacularly rit-
ualistic — that they tend to monopolize our interpretation of the riot. But early in
the riot, the Irish mobs made similar ritualistic attacks on whites: prolonged beat-
ing of the police commissioner who was arrogant enough to ride his horse alone
into a rioting crowd, or stabbing and burning small numbers of soldiers who were
overwhelmed by a large crowd while reloading their guns. But the white authori-
ties for the most part organized effectively to win their confrontations; the negroes
received the brunt of it because they became the easiest victims for the crowds to
dominate; and they did bear a symbolic relation to the purpose of the riot, since the
military draft and the entire war was perceived by the Irish as a movement to free
negro slaves. The targets of ritualistic cruelty, especially in modern or modernizing
situations, are episodically chosen, and what happens to them cannot be explained
simply by long-standing cultural prejudices. Of course prejudices and hostile ste-
reotypes exist, but violence is hard to carry out except when situational conditions
are favorable. In almost every instance where modern ethnic massacres have taken
place, not only were there currents of cultural hostility, but also considerable prag-
matic success of these same groups in living peacefully near each other.
I have analyzed one form of cruelty, arising from ritually bounded social
groups, where altruistic morality does not extend beyond the boundaries of one’s
own enclave, and deliberate public cruelty to enemies is a ritual of group solidarity.
Historically, the antidote to this form of cruelty is structural change, which dissolves
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dense groups and rigid boundaries into a fluid network of cosmopolitan contacts. To
be sure, the transitional period of democratization is a dangerous one, creating
opportunities for episodes of ritualistic cruelty on a mass scale (Mann, 2005). But
when the era of Durkheimian mechanical solidarity passes, so should the era of
Durkheimian ritualized public cruelty. Durkheim (1964 [1893]) thought that the
large-scale trend, as societies became more complex and differentiated, was towards
humanitarian identity on a global scale, what Talcott Parsons (1964) called univer-
salism. It is because movements towards universalistic altruism have become wide-
spread, especially among the educated classes since the 20th century that our
standards of what is cruelty have expanded: we have formulated many more things
as cruel than our ancestors would have recognized. It is useful to recognize this, be-
cause as sociologists we should be able to explain ourselves, including our most ide-
alistic aspects. Sociology would be glaringly incomplete if we could explain only the
bad guys, and leave the good guys as miraculously enlightened consciousnesses
who just happen to drop down into history at the present moment.
But although neo-Durkheimian sociology gives an optimistic view, on the
whole, of the structural trends of history with respect to cruelty, another side of
sociology is the neo-Weberian view, which points to the creation of a distinc-
tively modern form of cruelty. Ritualistically bounded enclaves characteristic of
tribal and aristocratic societies have been dissolved, to a large extent, not only
by the growth of complex differentiated networks, but by the state. From a
Weberian point of view, pre-modern society was largely organized around pat-
rimonial households (Weber, 1968 [1922]: 956-1110); enclaves of authority by
property-owning elders, who rule their families, household servants, and eco-
nomic dependents like independent fiefs. The growth of the modern state has
been to penetrate society, inscribing individuals on the rolls of the state as mili-
tary conscripts, as taxpayers, as subjects for education, health and welfare regu-
lation, and for political mobilization as citizens and voters. Organizationally, all
these activities were done by creating bureaucracies and expanding their reach;
bureaucracies based on the impersonal interchangeability of their subjects,
keeping records on all they come in contact with, acting according to written
rules. State bureaucracies have broken through the walls of patrimonial house-
holds, restricting the power of elders and parents, freeing their individual
members in some respects while tying them into bureaucratic regimentation in
other respects.
On the whole, bureaucratic penetration of society has created more individu-
alism, more cosmopolitanism, more concern for the universal and abstract than for
the local and the particular; and in this respect bureaucratized modernity has re-
duced the conditions which produce ritualistic cruelty. Indeed bureaucracy re-
duces the level of ritualism of everything. But the Kafkaesque iron cage that Weber
worried about before his death in 1920 has for the most part turned out to be less
rigorous than he expected; instead of one big dominating bureaucracy there have
been a multiplicity of overlapping bureaucracies. Persons working inside bureau-
cracies have gradually become more egalitarian and informal, at least in their per-
sonal dealings among themselves, even as we come to rely on a background of
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formal procedures which are built into organizational routine. Many bureaucra-
cies have turned out to be surprisingly benign, although perhaps this is mainly true
in rich societies during periods of economic growth.
The return of cruelty in its second form, bureaucratic cruelty, is most appar-
ent in bureaucracies whose task is to administer coercive power. This happens
when the state acts militarily or diplomatically against external states, and also in
the exercise of police power internally. The chief feature of bureaucracy is long
chains of command. Orders are given and procedures are formalized — sometimes
by chief executives or military commanders, but just as often by civilians, by
judges, by administrative review boards, by staff specialists whose task is to for-
mulate rules and regulations and circulate them throughout the organization.
Chains of responsibility are often complicated out of all recognition; the conse-
quences of decisions made in one place, of rules implemented through myriad
channels, are often invisible in the eyes of those made them. Bureaucracy operates
under a formal myth of responsibility, but in fact much of what happens consists of
what Robert Merton (1936) called “unanticipated consequences of purposive so-
cial action”. Since leaders and administrators are replaceable and indeed are often
replaced, and those who carry out a policy locally are far from those who formu-
lated it, the gap between what is officially intended and what actually happens is
often large. Sometimes the discrepancy is trivial and the organization muddles
along; sometimes it is comic, and bureaucrats themselves — ourselves — laugh
about its irrationalities; sometimes however the means are coercive and the results
are what I call bureaucratic callousness.
Take for example the diplomatic weapon of economic sanctions. This has
been used in recent decades as a tactic of mildness, avoiding the cruelties of war.
But international economic sanctions have rarely been effective in modifying the
policies of so-called rogue regimes, much less in overthrowing a despotic govern-
ment. To expect that increasing economic discontent among the people is a path to
revolution is sociologically ignorant; historical comparisons by Skocpol (1979),
Goldstone (1991), and others have shown that revolutions start at the top, with
state crises and splits among elites, frequently through military defeats and ex-
penses; the peaceful pathway to forcing regime change is in fact a mirage. Fifty
years of US policy towards Cuba is an example of this failure; and we should expect
little from sanctions against North Korea. Economic sanctions fall chiefly upon the
poorest people, while privileged groups survive economic sanctions better than
others, just as they survive most during disasters. Economic sanctions are often a
hidden form of cruelty, hidden by its distant bureaucratic mechanism and seem-
ingly impersonal mode of operation.
Warfare carried out by bureaucracy also produces much callous cruelty. Mas-
sive organizations, planning military operations from long distance, override indi-
vidual details. Even if war is waged in the name of humanitarian ideals, and even if
rules of engagement are spelled out to make fighting humane, the impersonal nature
of bureaucratic structure generates its own cruelty. Large-scale armies aim to de-
stroy not just the front line but the infrastructure of support; this means attacking not
only logistics and military communications but economic targets. In the last 20 years,
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increased scientific precision in targeting attempts to reduce collateral damage to ci-
vilians in one way, but increases it in another. As long-distance weapons become
more lethal, armies respond by dispersing and hiding (Biddle, 2004). This happens
not only in guerrilla war, where soldiers hide among the people, but even in conven-
tional warfare. Battlefields expand as armies avoid concentrating troops and mili-
tary equipment where they can be easily hit by long distance enemy artillery, rockets
or aerial bombing. Satellite communications and global computer networks allow
rich armies to avoid some of their own casualties by fighting via remote control, such
as with pilotless drones; but this is fighting in an ultra-bureaucratic mode, increasing
the tendency to impersonality; precisely because pilots are so far away and rely of
purely mechanical signals, drones like the US Predators flying deep inside Pakistan
or Afghanistan frequently hit civilians as well as military.
Besides these cruelties of the ever-expanding battlefield, there is a more basic,
inherent callousness of combat. Fighting takes precedence over anything else in
that location; wherever the enemy is met becomes the battlefield. Civilians who
happen to live there, even if they escape injury, have their homes wrecked or taken
over, their livelihood destroyed. They are turned into refugees. Wide battle fronts,
advances and retreats of armies, push refugees along with them, adding another
callous cruelty. The first concern of the military is to supply necessities such as food
and water to their own troops; refugees come a distant third, even after enemy pris-
oners. Battlefields create inadvertent disasters, as bad as hurricane, fire or earth-
quake, because they destroy the built environment which provides inhabitants
with basic necessities of life. The problem was not so severe historically in earlier
forms of war, where armies were smaller and battlefields could be encompassed by
a few thousand meters; modern battlefields covering hundreds or thousands of ki-
lometers impose callous damage on more noncombatants. The enormous popula-
tion losses of the Eastern Front in World War II were largely of this sort; a recent
example on a smaller scale is the damage to civilians in the successful war of the Sri
Lankan government against the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) ending in 2009.
Bureaucratic callousness adds another dimension to the Nazi holocaust and
similar episodes of genocide or population cleansing. Multiple causes of death were
involved; I would argue that even if the perpetrators’aim was not to murder the cap-
tured population, the effects of bureaucratic callousness in large-scale forced popu-
lation movements were responsible for many deaths. Herding crowds of people into
railroad cars for long journeys without food, water, heat or sanitation was bound to
kill many; forced labor camps do not have to deliberately construct gas chambers if
they keep the level of nutrition so low that people starve to death. The Armenian
genocide carried out by the Turkish regime in 1915-16 did not necessarily depend
upon official intent to exterminate the Armenians (Melson, 1992). Forcing them to
march hundreds of kilometers from their homes, with inadequate supplies, into the
Syrian desert was enough to kill many by sheer deprivation.
Let me add yet another mechanism to the complexities of cruelty. Bureau-
cratic callousness tends to create local conditions for the revival of ritualistic cru-
elty. People who are deprived of the basic means of subsistence become pathetic,
diseased, dirty; robbed of the means of normal dignified self-presentation, it
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becomes easy for their captors to regard them as subhuman. Masses of deprived
victims come to incite disgust rather than sympathy — in the same way that a dirty,
ugly beggar on the street makes us shudder. Thus the growth of sadism among
Nazi prison guards, and the Turkish populace along the route of the Armenian
forced march found it easy — at the moment the spectacle appeared before their
eyes — to despise and maltreat these forced refugees, adding many scenes of gratu-
itous ritual cruelty to a trajectory of suffering already formed on the macro level by
bureaucratic callousness.
In conclusion, a few words about the revival of torture. Incidents like those
perpetrated by American military guards in the Abu Ghraib prison developed in
the context of a bureaucratic organization, processing large numbers of captives.
Multiple causes contributed to the torture of prisoners. On one level, the official
chain of command sent down orders to extract information. This is a regular fea-
ture of all combat organization, which tries to gather intelligence from prisoners
about the enemy. This has gone on in all armies for hundreds of years; very little re-
search exists on how it has been done and what level of coercion has been regarded
as normal. In general, battlefield prisoners are interrogated rather quickly, which
tends to rule out prolonged or elaborate torture. What happened at Abu Ghraib is
better known, because it was documented by modern surveillance technology, the
mobile phone cameras of the guards themselves. What we saw goes into another
dimension, where torture becomes not instrumental but ritualistic, an end in itself.
Clearly the guards were enjoying humiliating the prisoners. Routine security pre-
cautions such as blindfolds were escalated to a further level, so that helplessly
blind, passive prisoners could be arranged in postures that were not only painful
but degrading. For the guards, this became an atmosphere of fun, from their per-
spective, full of laughter and humor. It added a sexual element, not only because of
forced nakedness but with a risqué quality from the presence of female soldiers in
the gender-integrated US army. For the guards, this was the atmosphere of a frater-
nity party.
Now we have come full circle. Ritual cruelty flourishes in small, close-knit
groups of local solidarity, when they have power over despised outsiders. Bureau-
cratic organizations, as sociological researchers found in the years after Max Weber,
contain an informal structure within. When the bureaucracy is a total institution, en-
compassing its inhabitants’ entire lives (Goffman, 1961), these ritual boundaries be-
come magnified. The bureaucratic military prison reconstructs within itself the
conditions of medieval society — the all-powerful aristocracy ruling over a de-
graded caste of peasant-slaves. The combination of high Durkheimian density and
ritualized vertical boundaries creates the conditions for ritual torture. As long as the
prison structure dominates, this is downward cruelty. But it is not surprising that
those who are humiliated respond, when they can, by ritual violence of rebellion
from below. The ceremonial beheading of Western captives shown on al-Qaeda
tapes are structurally like the Irish ritual mutilations of their token victims in the
New York uprising of 1863.
What can be done? Ritual cruelty is not as widespread as it was historically
because many structures have changed. But bureaucracy creates its own form of
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cruelty, and we need more explicit awareness in guarding against this. And
modern conditions can create little enclaves, revivals of tribalism which generate
the return of ritual cruelty. Here micro-sociology can help. Research by Stefan
Klusemann (2009) using video tapes from the 1994 Srebrenica massacre, has shown
there are micro-interactional turning points, when ritual violence is either un-
leashed or inhibited. Greater awareness of these micro-interactional processes —
both in their emotional dynamics, and in the dangerous configurations of small
group structures — can enable us to better train our own forces and avoid some of
the conditions which produce ritualistic cruelty. The micro is small, and these are
small steps. Nevertheless, the micro is something we can control, with sufficient
awareness of how it operates. In the end, sociology gives some grounds for
optimism.
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Resumo/abstract/résumé/resumen
Causas micro e macrossociológicas de atrocidades violentas
Uma forma de crueldade surge de grupos sociais unidos ritualmente, onde a mora-
lidade altruísta não ultrapassa as fronteiras e limites de cada um, e a deliberada cru-
eldade pública para com os inimigos é um ritual de solidariedade de grupo.
Demonstrações públicas ritualizadas de crueldade sobre vítimas indefesas estão for-
temente institucionalizadas em sociedades que combinam uma estratificação hierár-
quica com uma pertença de grupo fortemente ritualizada. A crueldade volta na sua
segunda forma, a insensibilidade burocrática, através da estrutura impessoal da
guerra moderna e do exercício do poder organizacional.
Palavras-chave violência ritual, dinâmica temporal, crueldade burocrática.
Micro and macro sociological causes of violent atrocities
One form of cruelty arises from ritually bounded social groups, where altruistic mo-
rality does not extend beyond the boundaries of one’s own enclave, and deliberate
public cruelty to enemies is a ritual of group solidarity. Ritualized public displays of
cruelty upon helpless victims are most strongly institutionalized in societies which
combine hierarchic stratification with strongly ritualized group membership. Cru-
elty returns in its second form, bureaucratic callousness, through the impersonal
structure of modern warfare and the exercise of organizational power.
Keywords ritual violence, time-dynamics, bureaucratic cruelty.
Causes micro- et macrosociologiques des atrocités violentes
Une forme de cruauté vient de groupes sociaux unis par des rites, où la moralité al-
truiste ne va pas au-delà des frontières et des limites de chacun et où la cruauté pu-
blique délibérée envers les ennemis est un rituel de solidarité du groupe. Les
démonstrations publiques ritualisées de cruauté envers des victimes sans défense
sont fortement institutionnalisées dans les sociétés qui allient une stratification
hiérarchique à une appartenance de groupe fortement ritualisée. La cruauté re-
vient sous sa seconde forme, l’insensibilité bureaucratique, à travers la structure
impersonnelle de la guerre moderne et de l’exercice du pouvoir organisationnel.
Mots-clés violence rituelle, dynamique temporelle, cruauté bureaucratique
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Causas micro y macrosociológicas de atrocidades violentas
Una forma de crueldad surge de grupos sociales unidos ritualmente, donde la mora-
lidad altruista no supera las fronteras y límites de cada uno, y la deliberada crueldad
pública hacia los enemigos es un ritual de solidaridad de grupo. Demostraciones pú-
blicas ritualizadas de crueldad sobre víctimas indefensas están fuertemente institu-
cionalizadas en sociedades que combinan una estratificación jerárquica con una
pertenencia de grupo fuertemente ritualizada. La crueldad vuelve en su segunda
forma, la insensibilidad burocrática, a través de la estructura impersonal de la guerra
moderna y del ejercicio del poder organizacional.
Palabras-clave violencia ritual, dinámica temporal, crueldad burocrática.
22 Randall Collins
SOCIOLOGIA, PROBLEMAS E PRÁTICAS, n.º 71, 2013, pp. 9-22. DOI:10.7458/SPP2013712327
